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SECTOR ALLOCATION: A MISGUIDED SOLUTION
Shannon Carroll*

I. INTRODUCTION
On April 9, 2010, the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS)1
issued Amendment 16 to the New England Multispecies2 (groundfish)
Fishery Management Plan, implementing what is known as “sector
allocation.”3 In its simplest form, sector allocation is a method of
allocating fishing privileges—the ability to harvest fish—to individual
groups of fishermen, who are then able to use, buy, or sell those
privileges.4 Sector allocation is a radical departure from traditional
management practices in New England, and, after nearly three decades of
pervasive overfishing, increasingly Draconian fishing regulations, and
ongoing legal battles, it has the potential to signal a positive new
direction for the New England groundfish fishery.5

* J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Maine School of Law.
1. The National Marine Fisheries Service is now known as NOAA Fisheries Service;
however, as a matter of consistency, this Comment will continue to refer to the Service as
NMFS.
2. The term “multispecies” refers to a stock of twelve species of bottom-dwelling
fish, including, most notably, cod and haddock. Roger Fleming et al., Twenty-Eight
Years and Counting: Can the Magnuson-Stevens Act Deliver on its Conservation
Promise?, 28 VT. L. REV. 579, 581 (2004).
3. 2010 Sector Operations Plans and Contracts, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,113, 18,113 (Apr. 9,
2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
4. Id.
5. See Daniel S. Holland & Joshua Wiersma, Free Form Property Rights for
Fisheries: The Decentralized Design of Rights-Based Management Through Groundfish
“Sectors” in New England, 34 MARINE POL’Y 1076, 1076-80 (2010). See generally
ROBERT J. JOHNSTON & JON G. SUTINEN, PEW ENV’T GRP., ONE LAST CHANCE: THE
ECONOMIC CASE FOR A NEW APPROACH TO FISHERIES MANAGEMENT IN NEW ENGLAND 14
(2009) [hereinafter ONE LAST CHANCE], available at http://www.pewenvironment.org/
uploadedFiles/PEG/Publications/Report/Johnston_Sutinen_2009.pdf (detailing empirical
support for sector allocation in the New England Groundfish fishery).
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Sector allocation fits within the broader category of “catch share”
fishery management programs.6 NMFS defines “catch share” as “a
general term for several fishery management strategies that allocate a
specific portion of the total allowable fishery catch to individuals,
cooperatives, communities, or other entities.”7 Generally, catch share
programs contain two elements: (1) an output control—an annual limit
on the total number of fish that can be harvested in a fishery, commonly
referred to as the “total allowable catch”; and (2) a transferable allocation
of that fishery’s annual catch limit to individual fishermen or vessels,
commonly referred to as “quota.”8
Catch shares are part of “a global movement” in fisheries
management toward a market-based approach to regulation and are
deeply rooted in economic perceptions of property rights, efficiency, and
stewardship.9 Accordingly, the theory behind catch shares is twofold:
the use of output controls allows fisheries managers to directly limit fish
mortality, while the allocation of transferable quota—in effect a quasiproperty interest—to individual fishermen incentivizes efficiency and
stewardship through ownership of fishing privileges.10
The success of catch share programs is well documented.11
Although each individual program is unique, catch share programs have
been implemented in over one hundred different fisheries worldwide.12
By and large, the evidence demonstrates that catch share programs
effectively control overfishing, reduce overcapitalization of the fishery
(generally through consolidation), and increase profits for remaining
6. See NOAA FISHERIES OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE FISHERIES, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NOAA CATCH SHARE POLICY i (2010) [hereinafter CATCH SHARE
POLICY], available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/domes_fish/catchshare/docs/
draft_noaa_cs_policy.pdf.
7. Id.
8. SETH MACINKO & WILLIAM WHITMORE, A NEW ENGLAND DILEMMA: THINKING
SECTORS THROUGH 13-14 (2009), available at http://www.uri.edu/personal/macinko/
NewEnglandDilemmaFinal.pdf; CATCH SHARE POLICY, supra note 6, at i.
9. Id.
10. See COMM. TO REVIEW INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
SHARING THE FISH: TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY ON INDIVIDUAL FISHING QUOTAS 33
(1999) [hereinafter SHARING THE FISH].
11. See, e.g., Christopher Costello et al., Can Catch Shares Prevent Fisheries
Collapse? 321 SCIENCE 1678, 1678-81 (2008) (chronicling the success of catch share
programs worldwide).
12. Individual Fishing Quota Act of 2001: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 107th Cong. 49 (2001) (statement of Jon G. Sutinen,
Professor, Department of Environmental and Natural Resource Economics, University of
Rhode Island).
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participants.13 Thus, there is little question as to the effectiveness of
catch share programs as a fishery management tool.14
That success raises several issues, however. Catch share programs
promote economic efficiency by creating a tradable market for quota.15
Almost inevitably, this entails consolidation of a fishery’s participants.16
But because the markets for quota are artificially designed by fisheries
managers, the way in which managers initially allocate quota and dictate
how that quota can be bought or sold becomes a determinative factor in
how quickly and to what degree that consolidation occurs.17 Not
surprisingly, in fisheries with a diverse array of participants, such as the
New England groundfish fishery, building broad support for catch share
programs is difficult.18
Catch shares raise other socioeconomic concerns as well. The
individual allocation of fishing privileges alters the traditional
perspective of viewing the seas as “commons”—a notion that still
resonates with coastal New England fishing communities.19 Moreover,
concerns over the consolidation of fishing effort and the perceived
privatization of a public resource often elicit visceral reactions from
fishermen, politicians, and community members who fear the loss of
economic opportunity and cultural heritage from their region.20 These

13. Id. at 49-50.
14. See, e.g., MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 46.
15. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 33-34.
16. See id. at 34-35.
17. See MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 36-37.
18. Id.
19. The description of fishing grounds as commons is derived from Garret Hardin’s
Tragedy of the Commons essay. Fishery regulators have increasingly limited access to
fishing grounds, which has been a major cause of friction in New England, where open
access is viewed as part of the New England fishing tradition. See, e.g., Operations of
the Regional Fishery Management Councils and the Reauthorization of the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
Resources, 109th Cong. (2005) (statement of Francis W. Blount, Jr., Chairman, New
England Fishery Management Council) [hereinafter Blount Statement] (noting the
extreme political volatility of limiting access in New England). As will be discussed
below, the implementation of the sector program is a further departure from this open
access tradition because, in effect, it allocates not just access, but a percentage of the total
catch to individuals. See infra Part II.
20. See Blount Statement, supra note 19 (“[F]ishery participants in New England
consider [catch shares] an extremely sensitive issue and a very real threat to fishing
communities and small boat fleets.”).
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concerns have spawned significant debate as to whether the benefits of
catch share programs outweigh their potential problems.21
Sector allocation is billed as an innovative solution to the issues
raised by catch share programs, as well as an answer to the chronic
overfishing of groundfish in the Gulf of Maine, for two reasons.22 First,
sector allocation is a voluntary management program.23 Fishermen may
choose to continue fishing under the existing regime, which regulates
catch through limits on days-at-sea, or opt to join the sector program.24
Second, the sector program shifts the burden of determining quota
allocation and implementing consolidation safeguards from the
government to the fishermen.25 Sector members negotiate allocation
through contractual agreements and are free to impose limits on
consolidation of quota through those agreements; therefore, the design of
the market structure is almost entirely up to the fishermen.26 Thus, on its
face, the sector program maintains the benefits of a traditional catch
share program (e.g., strict limits on fish mortality and increased
economic viability) while providing flexibility for fishermen and fishing
communities to find workable solutions to some of the more systemic
problems of catch share programs (e.g., control over allocation and the
rate at which consolidation occurs).
This Comment advances the debate over catch share programs by
considering whether sector allocation represents a potentially promising
new direction for fisheries regulation. To do so, Part II explores the legal
and historical framework that has set the stage for sector allocation and
explains why fisheries managers in New England had little choice but to
adopt the sector program. Next, Part III argues that sector allocation is
an imperfect response crafted to accommodate a number of wellintended but poorly conceived legal constraints and, therefore, is not a
promising innovation. Part IV concludes by recommending a modest
reform to the sector program, while specifically addressing how the legal
framework for catch share programs at the national level could be

21. See, e.g., RÖGNVALDUR HANNESSON, THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE OCEANS 147
(2004).
22. See generally ONE LAST CHANCE, supra note 5.
23. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262,
18,262 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648); see also ONE LAST CHANCE,
supra note 5, at 17-18.
24. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,263.
25. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 14-15.
26. 2010 Sector Operations Plans and Contracts, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,113, 18,113 (Apr. 9,
2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
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redesigned to retain its positive features while ameliorating some of its
problems.
II. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL CONTEXT FOR SECTORS
A. Closing the International Commons—The 1976 MagnusonStevens Act
For hundreds of years, the groundfish stocks off of New England’s
coast comprised one of the world’s greatest fisheries.27 Basque and
Viking fishermen routinely fished these waters long before the arrival of
Christopher Columbus,28 and “[f]our centuries of New England history,
culture and economic development [were] grounded in the harvest of
halibut, cod, haddock, and other fish.”29 Before 1977, when the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act went into effect, federal jurisdiction
of fisheries resources was limited to twelve nautical miles from shore.30
The waters beyond federal jurisdiction were considered the high seas—
an international commons with no governmental body or international
agreement regulating the extraction of fisheries resources.31
Given the fecundity of the resource, few before the twentieth century
believed that the groundfish fishery could be overfished.32 However,
with the arrival of technologically advanced foreign vessels to the Gulf
of Maine in the 1960s, it soon became apparent that even the great
groundfish fishery was vulnerable to overfishing.33 As a result, the
fishing industry lobbied for the exclusion of foreign vessels from

27. Fleming et al., supra note 2, at 581.
28. MARK KURLANSKY, COD: A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FISH THAT CHANGED THE WORLD
19-21, 24 (1997).
29. ONE LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 3.
30. H.R. REP. NO. 94-445, at 29 (1975).
31. Id. at 26.
32. KURLANSKY, supra note 28, at 32. Indeed, biologist Thomas Huxley made the
now ominous remark, “[I believe] that the cod fishery . . . and probably all the great sea
fisheries, are inexhaustible; that is to say, nothing we can do seriously affects the number
of the fish.” QUENTIN BONE & RICHARD H. MOORE, BIOLOGY OF FISHES 454 (3d ed.,
2008).
33. The first technologically advanced Russian fishing vessels began harvesting
groundfish from Georges Bank in 1960. PETER B. DOERINGER ET AL., THE NEW ENGLAND
FISHING ECONOMY: JOBS, INCOME, AND KINSHIP 17 (1986). Subsequently, hundreds of
foreign vessels began exploiting New England’s offshore fishing grounds, and by 1972,
the efforts of American fishermen accounted for only ten percent of the total harvest
taken from Georges Bank. Id.

168

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

offshore waters.34 Congress was receptive, blaming “the intense foreign
effort” for the depletion of the nation’s fish stocks.35 Viewing both the
biological depletion of the Gulf and the “old” and “inefficient” fishing
fleet present in the United States as symptoms of “a common property
resource,”36 Congress passed the Fisheries Conservation and
Management Act (now commonly known as the Magnuson-Stevens Act
(MSA)) in 1976, extending federal jurisdiction to 200 nautical miles and
excluding foreign vessels from within that boundary.37
The MSA established “[a] national program for the conservation and
management of fisheries resources in the United States” with the express
purposes of “prevent[ing] overfishing, . . . insur[ing] conservation, . . .
[and] realiz[ing] the full potential of the Nation’s fishery resources.”38 In
addition to extending federal authority to 200 nautical miles from the
U.S. coast,39 the MSA delegated regulatory authority to NMFS,40 through
the Secretary of Commerce.41 The MSA also established eight Regional
Fishery Management Councils as part of “a bifurcated decision-making
process for managing fishery resources within the EEZ . . . .”42 Each of
the eight councils holds authority over a geographic region and is
charged with reflecting the “expertise and interest of the several
constituent States” within that region.43 While councils perform a variety
34. Id. at 26.
35. H.R. REP. NO. 94-445, at 30 (1975).
36. Id.
37. DOERINGER ET AL., supra note 33, at 26; see also Rita Heimes, Managing A
Fishery Through Contract: Legal Issues Raised By Sector Operating Agreements in the
New England Multispecies Fishery, 14 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 17, 17-18 (2008). More
accurately, foreign vessels are only authorized to fish within U.S. EEZ if the particular
fishery is under utilized. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (2006).
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(6).
39. Id. § 1811(a) (the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)). Notably, states still retain
jurisdiction over the waters within three geographical miles from shore. 43 U.S.C. §
1301(a)(2) (2006).
40. More accurately, the MSA charges the Department of Commerce with authority to
implement the Act. However, in practice NOAA, delegating through NMFS, acts as the
primary regulatory authority. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REVIEWING ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENTS FOR FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLANS 9 (2005).
41. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1851, 1854.
42. George J. Mannina, Jr., Is There a Legal and Conservation Basis for Individual
Fishing Quotas? 3 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 5, 7 (1997).
43. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(2). The eight regions are: New England (Maine,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, New Hampshire, Connecticut); Mid-Atlantic (New York,
New Jersey, Delaware, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina); South
Atlantic (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida); Gulf of Mexico (Texas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Florida); Caribbean (U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico);
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of functions, their primary purpose is to prepare a fishery management
plan (FMP) for each fishery under federal jurisdiction.44 The FMP is the
“foundational” regulatory framework, providing the basic regulations
and policies that govern the fishery.45 All FMPs must be consistent with
the provision of the MSA.46 Once developed, the council must submit
the FMP to NMFS for approval, disapproval, or partial disapproval.47 If
a council wishes to modify an existing FMP, it may do so by
promulgating an amendment to the FMP.48 Amendments to the FMP
must meet the same legal standards as the original FMP.49
B. The Problem with Traditional Fisheries Management
The implementation of the MSA did little to alter traditional fisheries
management approaches. Under a traditional fisheries management
regime, managers rely on input controls—designed inefficiencies—to
control fish mortality.50 Input controls typically include gear restrictions
(e.g., minimum mesh size for nets), vessel restrictions (e.g., limits on the
size or capacity of fishing vessels), and license limitations (e.g.,
restriction on the number of licenses issued), all of which are designed to
indirectly control fish mortality.51 However, rather than achieving a
sustainable harvest, input controls almost always lead to problems of
overcapitalization and overfishing.52
Generally, input controls fail for two reasons. First, input controls
do not directly control the level of fish mortality; rather, input controls
dictate the level of fishing effort allowed to occur—directly, through trip
Pacific (California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho); North Pacific (Alaska, Washington,
Oregon); Western Pacific (Hawaii, American Samoa, Guam, Northern Mariana Islands).
Id. § 1852(a)(1)(A)-(H).
44. Id. § 1852(h)(1).
45. Scott C. Matulich et al., Policy Formulation Versus Policy Implementation Under
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act: Insight from the
North Pacific Crab Rationalization, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 239, 240 (2007).
46. 16 U.S.C. § 1853(a)(1)(C).
47. Id. § 1854(a)(3); Mannina, Jr., supra note 42, at 8.
48. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 40, at 15.
49. Id.
50. U.S. COMM'N ON OCEAN POLICY, AN OCEAN BLUEPRINT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
290 (2004) [hereinafter OCEAN BLUEPRINT]; see, e.g., SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10,
at 115.
51. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 115.
52. Neal D. Black, Note, Balancing the Advantages of Individual Transferable Quotas
Against Their Redistributive Effects: The Case of Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 9 GEO.
INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 727, 729-31 (1997).
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limits, or indirectly, through gear restrictions and shortened seasons.53
As a result, fisheries managers are effectively forced to predict the level
of catch per effort, leading to a great deal of uncertainty and regulatory
flux within the fishery.54 Second, input controls create an incentive for
fishermen to invest in more advanced vessels and gear.55 As managers
aim to make the fishery less efficient, fishermen set out to make their
harvest more efficient.56 The result is an overcapitalized fishery, with
fishing effort exceeding biological limits.57 In turn, managers are forced
to constantly amend fishing regulations, resulting in regulatory flux.58
Similarly, the primary method of output controls imposed under
traditional fisheries management regimes—a total allowable catch (TAC)
limiting the amount of fish that may be harvested during a fishing
season—further exacerbates the problems of overcapitalization and
economic inefficiency.59 Namely, when a TAC is imposed as the sole
output measure (known as a stand-alone TAC), rather than individually
allocated through a catch share program, the “race for the fish” becomes
increasingly more competitive.60 This phenomenon occurs because
under a stand-alone TAC, the fishery closes once the TAC is reached;
thus, instead of racing against the biological limits of the fishery,
fishermen must now compete against each other for individual shares of
the TAC. 61 As in a fishery managed under input controls, fishermen are
given an incentive to invest in more advanced vessels and gear, leading
to further overcapitalizing of the fishery.62 In turn, the race for the fish
leads to shorter seasons, as the capacity of the fleet increases while the
53. ONE LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 6.
54. Id. at 9.
55. Id. at 6.
56. See Ransom E. Davis, Individually Transferable Quotas and the Magnuson Act:
Creating Economic Efficiency in Our Nation’s Fisheries, 5 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
267, 299 (1996).
57. NAT’L MARINE FISHERIES SERV., NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., THE
DESIGN AND USE OF LIMITED ACCESS PRIVILEGE PROGRAMS 5-6 (Lee G. Anderson &
Mark C. Holliday eds., 2007) [hereinafter DESIGN OF LAPPS].
58. Id. In the Northeast groundfish fishery, the futility of these controls is welldocumented. Until the adoption of the sector allocation program, the New England
Fishery Management Council primarily managed effort, and thus fish mortality, by
limiting both the number of entrants to the fishery and the number days a vessel could
spend at sea. Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1077. Yet even as fisheries managers
reduced days at sea and implemented additional input controls, groundfish landings
continued to increase and fishing mortality regularly exceeded overfishing thresholds. Id.
59. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 287.
60. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 14.
61. Id.
62. See id. at 14-15.
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TAC remains stagnant.63 In the most extreme cases, fishing seasons are
compressed into a matter of minutes.64 Additionally, stand-alone TAC
fisheries augment “supply gluts” in the market, a phenomenon that not
only has an adverse effect on market prices for fishermen, but also for
fish quality and supply for processors, dealers, and ultimately
consumers.65 Thus, while TACs are successful in controlling fish
mortality—if set at the correct level—they are not successful in
promoting an economically viable fishery.
A condensed history of the management of the New England
groundfish fishery demonstrates these failures of traditional fisheries
management. Following the passage of the MSA in 1977, the New
England Fisheries Management Council (the Council) inherited a
groundfish fishery that was left depleted by foreign vessels.66 Initially,
the Council began regulating the fishery through the use of quotas
(stand-alone TACs) and input controls (minimum mesh and fish size
limits).67 However, as national fleet capacity increased over time, the
Council quickly abandoned quota-based regulations, viewing such
measures as a hindrance to growth.68 Although groundfish stocks
initially showed signs of recovery, this phenomenon was largely
attributed to the absence of foreign fishing pressure,69 and, as the
domestic fleet expanded, the downward biological trend continued.70 In
1986, the Council implemented more restrictive input controls (again,
minimum mesh and fish sizes) with the promulgation of the Northeast
Multispecies FMP.71 The Council’s restrictions proved ineffective,
63. See e.g., id.
64. For example, British Columbian herring fishermen reached the fishery’s annual
TAC eight minutes into the season. Polly Ghazi et al., Our Plundered Seas, THE
OBSERVER (LONDON), Apr. 2, 1995, reprinted in WORLD PRESS REVIEW, June 1, 1995.
65. REDSTONE STRATEGY GROUP & ENVTL. DEF., ASSESSING THE POTENTIAL FOR
LAPPS IN U.S. FISHERIES 5-6 (2007) [hereinafter REDSTONE].
66. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 275.
67. Madeleine Hall-Arber, Co-Management at the Eleventh Hour? Participation in
the Governance of the New England Groundfish Fishery, in 4 REVIEWS: METHODS AND
TECHNOLOGIES IN FISH BIOLOGY AND FISHERIES 141, 145 (2005).
68. Steven A. Murawski, The New England Groundfish Resource: A History of
Population Change in Relation to Harvesting, in THE DECLINE OF FISHERIES RESOURCES
IN NEW ENGLAND: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OVERFISHING, CONTAMINATION, AND
HABITAT DEGRADATION 11, 16 (Robert Buchsbaum et al. eds., 2005).
69. William E. Robinson & Judith Pederson, Contamination, Habitat Degradation,
Overfishing - An “Either-Or” Debate?, in THE DECLINE OF FISHERIES RESOURCES IN NEW
ENGLAND: EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF OVERFISHING, CONTAMINATION, AND HABITAT
DEGRADATION 1, 1-3 (Robert Buchsbaum et al. eds., 2005).
70. Id. at 1.
71. Hall-Arber, supra note 67, at 145.
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largely as a result of increased fishing effort within the confines of the
existing regulatory framework,72 and in 1989, the Council declared
several of the stocks overfished, leading again to more restraining
regulations that also failed to end overfishing.73
In 1991, the Conservation Law Foundation sued the Department of
Commerce and the Council, alleging that they had failed to prevent
overfishing as mandated under the MSA and its corresponding
regulations.74 The Conservation Law Foundation specifically cited the
inability of input controls to reduce fish mortality.75 The suit led to the
implementation of Amendment 5 to the Multispecies FMP and, as a
result of warnings of the “imminent collapse of Georges Bank cod,” to
emergency closures of parts of the Gulf of Maine.76 The crux of the
Amendment 5 regulations, however, was imposition of a limited entry
system, which effectively closed access to new entrants, and a days-atsea program, which limited the number of days-at-sea a vessel could
fish.77
Amendment 5, like its predecessors, proved unsuccessful in
controlling fish mortality and groundfish stocks continued to decline.78
In 1996, the Council adopted Amendment 7, which limited the days-atsea program, tightened daily catch limits on the fishery, and restricted
mesh size of trawling nets.79 Over the next several years, the Council
promulgated additional amendments and “framework adjustments”80
imposing significant cuts to the days-at-sea program and introducing a
buyback program to reduce fleet capacity.81
By 2001, the Multispecies groundfish FMP had been altered more
than thirty times, with limited success.82 The Conservation Law
72. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 287.
73. Hall-Arber, supra note 67, at 145.
74. Robinson & Pederson, supra note 69, at 1.
75. Murawski, supra note 68, at 17.
76. Robinson & Pederson, supra note 69, at 2. NOAA scientists warned: “Failure to
take strong management actions now to preserve the limited spawning biomass for [the
Gulf of Maine] cod may have severe and potentially long-lasting consequences for both
the stock and fishery.” Murawski, supra note 68, at 17.
77. ONE LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 8.
78. Robinson & Pederson, supra note 69, at 1-2.
79. Hall-Arber, supra note 67, at 145.
80. A framework adjustment is a change to the existing FMP that requires fewer
procedural steps than an amendment and is therefore used to implement regulatory
changes quickly, during the fishing season. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 40, at
15.
81. Hall-Arber, supra note 67, at 145.
82. Id. at 146.
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Foundation filed a second lawsuit alleging, among other things, that the
rebuilding plans implemented by NMFS and the Council were not
sufficient to end overfishing.83 The second suit led to the development of
Amendment 13, which aimed to “address stock rebuilding issues, greatly
reduce fishing effort and capacity in the multispecies fishery and
implement additional measures to specifically address habitat
protection.”84 Among other input restrictions, Amendment 13 severely
restricted the allowable days-at-sea for fishermen in the fishery.85
However, the drastic measures imposed under Amendment 13 also failed
to end overfishing, setting the stage for the sector initiative.86
Thus, the history of the New England groundfishery demonstrates
the failures of the status quo. The Council’s reliance on input controls
failed to effectively reduce fish mortality, in part because the Council
was politically unable to introduce regulations that were stringent
enough, and in part because of the inherent inability of input controls to
directly affect fish mortality. 87
C. The Rise of the Catch Share Solution
The failures of the New England groundfish fishery are not unique.
As fish stocks throughout the country continued to decline during the
1980s, Regional Fishery Management Councils struggled to impose
regulations that effectively controlled fish mortality.88 Traditional
management methods locked regulators and fishermen in a cyclical battle
that required increasingly “Draconian command-and-control measures”
in order to achieve any semblance of conservation.89 Consequently, in
this context of management failure and subsequent economic and
biological decline, fisheries managers began experimenting with marketbased quota programs.90
The theory behind market-based quota programs was not new. Since
the 1950s, many fisheries economists have argued for a property-rights

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. DANIEL S. HOLLAND, GULF OF ME. RESEARCH INST., COMMUNITY-BASED SECTORS
FOR THE NEW ENGLAND GROUNDFISH FISHERY 8 (2007).
86. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262,
18,292 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
87. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 275, 287.
88. Id.
89. REDSTONE, supra note 65, at 4-6.
90. See, e.g., SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 26.
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solution to the problem of overfishing.91 As managers began recognizing
the increased role of markets and economic factors “in protecting
environments and managing natural resources,” incorporating these
concepts into fisheries management seemed like a logical outgrowth.92
In practice, at least from a global perspective, these approaches also were
not new. Countries such as Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Iceland
began experimenting with market-based programs beginning in the late
1970s, with significant success.93 However, because market-based
programs ran counter to what was seen by many as a “freedom to fish,”
these ideas struggled to take hold in the United States until the early
1990s.94
As support for market-based programs gained traction in the United
States, managers began experimenting with individual fishing quotas
(IFQs) and individual transferable quotas (ITQs).95 Under an IFQ
regime, fisheries managers allocate a specific amount of quota—usually
a percentage of the TAC—to each eligible fisherman.96 In turn, this
quota can be harvested, bought, sold, or leased by the quota holder or
other entities.97
Today, the breadth of market-based programs has expanded beyond
IFQs.98 In order to capture this diversity under a single term, NMFS
refers to such programs as “catch shares.” As discussed earlier, NMFS
defines “catch share” as “a general term for several fishery management
strategies that allocate a specific portion of the total allowable catch to
individuals, cooperatives, communities, or other entities.”99 Put more
directly, catch shares provide the benefits of output controls (a hard limit
on the level of fish mortality in the form of a TAC) while reducing the
incentive to race for the fish by allocating a portion of that TAC to an
individual, community, or group.100
91. See, e.g., H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property
Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POLITICAL ECON. 124, 132-33 (1954).
92. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 26.
93. Id. at 26-32.
94. Id. at 26.
95. Id. The term IFQ and ITQ are often used interchangeably, with IFQ being the
more common term in the United States. The technical difference between the two is that
IFQs could, in theory, include some type of non-transferable permit; however, in practice
there is little distinction between the terms. For the purposes of this Comment, the term
IFQ will encompass ITQs. See, e.g., DESIGN OF LAPPS, supra note 57, at 1.
96. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 288.
97. Id.
98. See DESIGN OF LAPPS, supra note 57, at 1.
99. CATCH SHARE POLICY, supra note 6, at 3.
100. See id.
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Catch share programs have several general advantages over
traditional fisheries management approaches. Most notably, catch share
programs are effective at curbing overcapitalization of the fishery.101
When TAC is individually allocated, as is the case with most catch
shares, fishermen are no longer compelled to race for the fish;102
consequently, there is less economic incentive to invest in larger vessels
and advanced technology.103 Likewise, markets and consumers benefit
by receiving a higher quality product that is delivered throughout the
year, instead of in short windows correlating with fishing seasons.104
Additionally, safety and gear conflicts typically decline because quota
owners have greater flexibility in dictating both the type of weather and
the speed in which they harvest fish.105 Finally, proponents argue that
catch shares provide greater incentives for stewardship and
sustainability.106
Conversely, several common issues arise from the implementation of
catch share programs. As noted above, catch shares are a useful tool to
improve the efficiency of a fishery.107 In practice, however, this usually
means consolidating the number of participants in the fishery.108 Thus,
one of the fundamental problems that fisheries managers face in the
designing of catch share programs is determining “just the right number
of people” for the fishery—a process that inherently requires a degree of
social engineering and judgment.109 Hence, the process by which the
initial allocation of fishing privileges is determined raises many issues of
fairness.110 In turn, catch shares often reduce the number of crew
101. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4.
102. For example, the length of the Alaskan halibut fishery expanded from 3 to 245
days after the introduction of IFQs. TERRY ANDERSON & DONALD LEAL, FREE MARKET
ENVIRONMENTALISM 113-14 (2001).
103. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. ONE LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 6.
107. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4.
108. DESIGN OF LAPPS, supra note 57, at 8.
109. Id.
110. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4. To a certain degree, the success of and
support for catch share programs is derived from the argument that market forces will
“determine the right number of people.” MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 47-48.
However, because catch share programs are artificially created markets—they are created
and designed by fisheries managers—the decisions about how a catch share program will
operate ultimately require determining winners and losers. Id. For example, the way in
which managers initially allocate quota affects the rate of consolidation. Id.; SHARING
THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4. If managers use an individual’s catch history to determine
initial allocation (the most common practice), then factors such as the duration of the
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positions available and increase entry costs for new participants because
consolidation reduces the number of vessels participating in the
fishery.111
In addition to economic and social criticisms, observers also question
whether catch shares promote environmental stewardship within the
fishery.112 Specifically, critics note that catch share programs may
incentivize
environmentally
destructive
practices
such
as
“highgrading”—a practice in which fishermen, seeking to fill their quota
with the highest-value fish possible, discard less valuable fish.113
Beyond the practical arguments, the push for catch share programs
can be viewed as an outgrowth of traditional Western economic and
political thought, “where markets are the source of efficiency and,
ultimately, of economic growth and social welfare.”114 Indeed, from an
economic perspective, the problem, and therefore the solution, is fairly
straightforward. Through the economic lens, the “fisheries problem” is
one of a lack of property rights: because the individual fisherman has no
property interest in the fish he does not catch, the individual fisherman
has no vested interest in the future of the fishery.115 Accordingly, as the
fishery becomes increasingly competitive due to more entrants and/or
fewer fish, fishermen invest in more technologically advanced boats and
equipment.116
Consequently, the fishery becomes dramatically
overcapitalized to the point where the cost of fishing effort rises as the
biological integrity of the fishery declines.117 Thus, economic theory
suggests that the solution to a lack of property rights is the
implementation of a property rights system.
catch history sample and the period from which that sample is taken directly favor certain
individuals over others. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 47-48; SHARING THE
FISH, supra note 10, at 4. Likewise, the limits that managers place on the trading and
selling of quota affect the rate and degree of consolidation. MACINKO & WHITMORE,
supra note 8, at 47-48; SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4. In the Alaskan halibut
fishery, for instance, quota ownership is restricted by vessel length (e.g., a fisherman with
a sixty-five foot vessel may only harvest quota assigned to that vessel class).
Consequently, the rate and degree of consolidation is limited because, as a practical
matter, quota transferability is not fluid. See SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4.
111. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 4.
112. Katrina Wyman, From Fur to Fish: Reconsidering the Evolution of Private
Property, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 117, 160 (2005).
113. Id.
114. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 26.
115. Gordon, supra note 91, at 130-31.
116. Id. at 133.
117. Id.; see also SUZANNE IUDICELLO ET AL., FISH, MARKETS, AND FISHERMEN: THE
ECONOMICS OF OVERFISHING 36-38 (1999).
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However, viewing the success of catch shares solely through an
economic lens oversimplifies and mischaracterizes the problem of
traditional fisheries management. First, as a matter of law, catch shares
are not, nor have they ever been a property right.118 Instead, catch shares
are an allocated privilege granting access to the fish, not a right to the
fish themselves.119 Moreover, these privileges may be revoked “at any
time.”120 Thus, the success of catch share programs is not caused by the
creation of a property right in a fishery because, as a matter of law, no
property right exists.121 Rather, the success stems from the ability to
implement a TAC—a strict limit on fish mortality—while rationalizing
the fishery through the assignment of privileges in a way that maintains
economic, and to a lesser degree, social stability.122 On the surface, the
distinction appears to be little more than semantics; however, much of
the hostility to catch shares, particularly in New England, stems from
their characterization of catch shares as a property right.123 Thus, in
order to further the debate regarding the use of catch shares, it is
important to precisely define why they succeed.
D. The Sustainable Fisheries Act of 1996—A Moratorium on Catch
Shares
As the number of catch share programs grew in the United States, so
did the division between proponents and opponents of the program:
What occurred in the [catch share] fisheries in the first half of the
1990s strengthened the forces both for and against putting other
fisheries in the United States under [catch share] regimes. To
many these developments seemed a resounding success. The
industry became more efficient, fishing effort was reduced, the
fishing season became longer, and the fish was turned into a
more valuable product. The time seemed ripe for applying this
regime to other fisheries in the United States. Others saw
undesirable consequences, or regarded as negative effects that
others viewed as positive. Concentration of quotas in fewer
hands, higher price of quotas and barriers to entry, more supplies
into the fresh fish market and less processing, decline in
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b) (2006).
DESIGN OF LAPPS, supra note 57, at 5.
16 U.S.C. § 1853a(b)(2).
MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 48.
See id.
See id. at 54-55.
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employment of fishermen and their wages; these were viewed by
some people as undesirable and not to be repeated in other
settings.124
Responding to the polarizing opinions, Congress amended the MSA in
1996, placing a four-year moratorium on the application of catch shares
in U.S. fisheries, in anticipation of a three-year study by the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) analyzing the effectiveness of the catch
share program.125 Although the report ultimately recommended that
Congress lift the ban, the debate over catch share programs raged on,
leading to a two-year extension of the moratorium in 2000.126
In 1999, the NAS published its findings. The three-year study
ultimately concluded that:
[Catch shares] should be allowed as an option in fisheries
management if a regional council finds them to be warranted by
conditions within a particular fishery and appropriate measures
are imposed to avoid potential adverse effects. The issues of
initial allocation, transferability, and accumulation of shares
should be given careful consideration when [catch share]
programs are considered and developed by regional councils and
reviewed by the Secretary of Commerce.127
Additionally, the NAS study noted several generalized outcomes of catch
share programs.128 First, the report concluded that catch share programs
significantly reduce the size of the fleet in a catch share managed
fishery.129 For example, after IFQs were implemented in Alaska’s
halibut and sablefish fisheries, the fleet sizes decreased by forty-two
percent and fifty-two percent respectively.130 Consequently, the report
noted that the decrease in vessel numbers led to greater profits amongst
those remaining in the fishery.131 Second, the report found that longer
fishing seasons typically ensued, as the race for fish under a TAC
management approach was removed.132 However, the NAS report also
found several generalized adverse effects. Notably, the report found that,
124. HANNESSON, supra note 21, at 147.
125. OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at 289. See also Sustainable Fisheries Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 108(d)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 3559, 3576 (1996) (repealed 2002).
126. HANNESSON, supra note 21, at 151.
127. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 5.
128. Id. at 99.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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in addition to decreased employment within the fishing sector, a
significant power shift had occurred from deckhands to vessel/permit
owners. 133
E. The Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act of 2006—A
Compromised Solution to Catch Share Implementation
Ironically, the congressionally mandated moratorium on catch share
programs spurred interest in their development.134 Likewise, the
recommendations by the NAS in 1999 helped to push the issue back onto
the congressional stage.135 The array of House-and-Senate-proposed bills
and subcommittee meetings in the period following the moratorium
indicate both the politicization of the issue as well as the seriousness with
which Congress set about looking for a solution.136 When Congress
began work on the Magnuson-Stevens Reauthorization Act (MSRA) in
2005, the issue of catch shares was front and center. The result is the
addition, in section 303A to the MSA, of a set of national guidelines for
catch share programs.137
From a national perspective, section 303A represents a hard-fought
compromise on the catch share debate. Drawing heavily on the
recommendations of the NAS and a corresponding report by the U.S.
Ocean Commission,138 section 303A sets forth a voluminous list of
guidelines and is meant “to be as comprehensive as possible in
133. The report attributed the cause of the power shift “to the generation and ownership
of new economic value reflected in [catch shares] and to the fact that ownership of
originally issued [catch shares] is generally concentrated among vessel owners, rather
than the crew or processing sectors.” Id. at 103. Put another way, catch share programs
allocate fishing privileges only to vessel or permit owners, effectively precluding
consideration of a crewman’s historic involvement in the fishery. See id. Thus,
vessel/permit owners are allocated a financial stake in the fishery that typically has
market value, whereas crewmen are afforded no such consideration. This fact has
particular significance when a fishery undergoes consolidation. See id. Vessel/permit
owners who exit the fishery are able to sell or lease their quota and thus receive an
economic benefit from the consolidation. See id. Conversely, crewmen forced to exit the
fishery are provided no such benefit. See id.
134. SETH MACINKO & DANIEL W. BROMLEY, WHO OWNS AMERICA’S FISHERIES? 1
(2002); see also Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1076.
135. See S. REP. NO. 109-229, at 9 (2006) (noting the reliance on the NAS report
findings).
136. See Fishing Conservation and Management Amendments Act of 2004, S. 2066,
108th Cong. § 11(a) (2004); Fishing Quota Act of 2003, S. 1106, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(1)
(2003); Fishing Quota Standards Act of 2003, H.R. 2621, 108th Cong. § 2(a)(1) (2003).
137. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a (2006).
138. Id.
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describing the rules governing the implementation of [catch shares].”139
For example, section 303A establishes eligibility restrictions on quota
ownership,140 provides safeguards for the initial allocation quota,141 and
places a cap on the total amount of quota an individual or entity may
own.142 Additionally, section 303A mandates that fishery managers
“consider the basic cultural and social framework of the fishery,” while
giving particular consideration to the “sustained participation of small
owner-operated fishing vessels and fishing communities that depend on
the fisheries.”143 Thus, in its entirety, section 303A establishes numerous
procedural and substantive measures meant to soften the disruptive social
and economic effects of catch shares.
Importantly, section 303A still affords the Regional Fishery
Management Councils a significant level of deference in the actual
design of the catch share program itself.144 The allowance for flexibility
at the Regional Fishery Management Council level is fundamental to the
design and implementation of a successful catch share program.145 Both
the NAS and the U.S. Commission on Ocean Policy reports emphasize
that the needs for each fishery are unique and that a standardized catch
share program will not be effective.146 Indeed, “an approach that
balances the benefits of regional flexibility with the need for a national
policy [on catch shares]” was an explicit goal of the legislation.147 Thus,
section 303A establishes protective measures to ameliorate the negative
139. Peter Schikler, Comment, Has Congress Made it Harder to Save the Fish? An
Analysis of the Limited Access Privilege Program (LAPP) Provisions of the MagnusonStevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization Act of 2006, 17 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 908, 919 (2008).
140. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(1)(D).
141. Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(A).
142. Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(D).
143. Id. § 1853a(c)(5)(B).
144. Patricia Kurkul, Reg’l Adm’r, NOAA Fisheries Serv., Panel IV: Resource
Allocation and the Magnuson-Stevens Act at the Roger Williams University School of
Law Symposium: Taking Stock: The Magnuson-Stevens Act Revisited (Nov. 5, 2008)
[hereinafter Kurkul Symposium] (recording available at http://streamer.rwu.edu/
mediaservices/MarineLaw/Panel4.wmv).
Under the MSA, the Regional Fishery
Management Councils develop amendments to a fishery’s Fisheries Management Plan
(the method by which a catch share program would be implemented). 16 U.S.C. §
1852(h)(1).
NOAA may only approve, disapprove, or partially approve such
amendments. Id. § 1854(a)(3).
145. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 195; OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at
290.
146. SHARING THE FISH, supra note 10, at 194-95; OCEAN BLUEPRINT, supra note 50, at
290.
147. S. REP. NO. 109-229, at 9 (2006).
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side effects of catch share programs while allowing the Regional
Councils the flexibility to adopt a program that incorporates those
protective measures.
Yet, from a New England perspective, section 303A significantly
hinders that flexibility by creating a referendum requirement specific to
the New England Regional Council.148 The referendum requirement
prohibits the New England Regional Council from submitting “a fishery
management plan or amendment that creates an individual fishing quota
program . . . unless such a system, as ultimately developed, has been
approved by more than 2⁄3 of those voting in a referendum among
eligible permit holders.”149
The referendum requirement is a bit of a paradox. On the one hand,
it reflects the apprehension among New England politicians, fishery
managers, and fishermen of the possibility of implementing a catch share
program.150 Citing fears of the economic consequences of consolidation
and an end to a “traditional” way of life, particularly for smaller-scale
fishermen, representatives from the region expressed hesitation about
section 303A’s ability to protect fishermen from the negative effects of
catch share programs.151 Accordingly, it was included to protect those
interests from being saddled with an unwanted catch share program.152
However, given the seemingly inherent controversy surrounding the use
of catch share programs and the diverse array of fishing interests
represented in the New England groundfish fishery, the prospect of the
Council proposing a catch share program that meets the approval of all
permit holders is unlikely. Thus, the practical effect of the referendum
148. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(6)(D)(i).
149. Id.; see also Schikler, supra note 139, at 923 (noting that the Council will likely be
“hamstrung” by the referendum requirement).
150. Schikler, supra note 139, at 923.
151. For example, George LaPointe, Commissioner of the Maine Department of
Marine Resources testified:
As reauthorization has been discussed over the past few years, Maine has been in
the somewhat difficult position of providing input on standards for a system that
the majority of people in the state hope will never be used to manage our fisheries.
There is a fundamental belief that the implementation of [catch shares], or ITQs as
they were previously known, would mean the end of the traditional character of the
New England fleet. Under the traditional ITQ structure, corporate consolidation of
the fisheries seemed an inevitable result.
Reauthorization of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. & Transp., 109th Cong. 15 (2005)
(statement of George LaPointe, Comm’r, Maine Department of Marine Resources); see
also Blount Statement, supra note 19.
152. Schikler, supra note 139, at 924-25.
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requirement is to either exclude catch shares as an option or to bind the
Council into developing a catch share program outside of the section
303A requirements.
F. The Amendment 16 Process
In 2006, the Council began drafting Amendment 16 to the Northeast
Multispecies FMP. By that time, the legal framework and political
culture surrounding fisheries management had shifted dramatically.
While the plethora of amendments and framework adjustments that
preceded Amendment 16 occurred in a climate of legislative indifference
or opposition toward catch shares, Congress had implicitly, if not
explicitly, signaled its support for catch shares through section 303A.153
On a national level, the establishment of guidelines for catch share
programs had tilted the political scales in favor of such programs.154
Moreover, for the first time, Congress had included amendments to the
MSA that mandate the implementation of TACs and impose strict
deadlines to end overfishing.155 Lastly, there was at least a semblance of
agreement between fisheries managers and fishermen that the status quo
was not working for the New England groundfish fishery.156
From the outset, the Council faced a tough mandate to end historic
overfishing. Revisions were necessary under Amendment 13 in order to
meet specific biological benchmarks for groundfish stocks by 2009.157
The revisions required were severe. Because eleven groundfish stocks
were classified as “subject to overfishing” and eleven stocks were
“overfished,” the Council was required to “adopt rebuilding programs”
that addressed those stocks and “revise management measures necessary
to end overfishing, rebuild overfished groundfish stocks, and mitigate the
adverse economic impacts of increased effort controls based upon the
results of [recent stock assessments].”158 In addition, new amendments to
the MSA, including the requirement that annual catch limits (TACs) and

153. See supra Part II.E. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1853a (2006) (authorizing the use
of catch share programs).
154. See MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 17 (noting the increase in support for
catch shares from politicians and environmental advocacy organizations).
155. 16 U.S.C. § 1854(e)(3).
156. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 20.
157. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262,
18,262 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
158. Id.
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accountability measures for each overfished stock be implemented by
2010, imposed additional mandates on the Council.159
Accordingly, both Council members and fishermen were aware that
Amendment 16 would lead to further restrictions on effort in the
fishery.160 Under the prevailing management system, which relied
primarily on days-at-sea and other input controls, additional effort
reduction would have resulted in a dramatic reduction in the economic
viability of the fishery.161 Consequently, “there was increased interest in
alternative management approaches that would improve [the] economic
viability” of the fishery, while allowing the Council to meet its goals
under Amendment 16 and the requirements of the MSRA.162
Limiting the available alternative approaches, however, was the
requirement that the Council impose TACs for all overfished stocks by
2010.163
Similar to input controls, stand-alone TACs augment
overcapitalization and lead to decreases in the economic sustainability of
the fishery. Further, as a result of the rebuilding efforts mandated under
the MSRA and Amendment 13, the TAC for the fishery would be too
small to support the fleet at current levels of effort under the days-at-sea
program.164 Thus, given that “[p]ast experiences with [stand-alone
TACs] have shown that they are fraught with problems that are difficult
to solve,” the Council did not view a stand-alone TAC as an option.165
Not surprisingly, the Council viewed a catch share alternative as the
best solution to maintain economic efficiency in the fishery while
meeting the requirements of the MSRA.166 In fact, the groundfish fishery
displayed all the classic signs of a fishery ripe for such a program. The
fishery was overfished, overcapitalized, and straddled with a complex,

159. See Magnuson-Stevens Act, Pub. L. No. 109-479, Sec. 104(5), MSA § 303 note.
160. Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1077.
161. Telephone Interview with Douglas Christel, Fishery Policy Analyst, Nat’l Marine
Fisheries Serv. (Mar. 1, 2011) (notes on file with author).
162. Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1077.
163. See Magnuson-Stevens Act, Pub. L. No. 109-479, Sec. 104(5), MSA § 303 note.
164. Christel, supra note 161.
165. NEW ENGLAND FISHERY MGMT. COUNCIL, DRAFT AMENDMENT 16 TO THE
NORTHEAST MULTISPECIES FISHERY MANAGEMENT PLAN, INCLUDING A DRAFT
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT AND AN INITIAL REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ANALYSIS 66 (2008) [hereinafter AMENDMENT 16 DEIS], available at
http://www.nefmc.org/nemulti/council_mtg_docs/ Feb2009/4_010928_Council_Draft_
A16.pdf.
166. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262,
18,276 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648); Christel, supra note 161.
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multifarious array of effort controls.167 Simply put, the fishery was
neither biologically nor economically viable.168
However, regulatory-imposed deadlines complicated the matter; the
Council was required to meet a 2009 deadline to implement “necessary
revisions” to the groundfish FMP and a 2010 deadline to implement a
TAC on all overfished stocks.169 Yet, the MSRA also required that the
Council, in passing any IFQ or similar catch share program, receive the
support of two-thirds of all permit holders through a referendum.170
Given the historic opposition to catch share programs and the lack of
support for one specific catch share option, the Council did not believe it
could meet the regulatory deadlines and obtain the necessary votes to
pass the referendum.171
Indeed, the Amendment 16 process indicates that the Council viewed
the referendum as a significant obstacle in meeting the deadlines
mandated by the MSRA. For example, while IFQs and a “points system”
were discussed as options during 2006 and early 2007,172 both IFQs and
the points system alternatives were removed from consideration within
months of the passage of the MSRA.173 As noted in the 2008 Draft Final
Environmental Impact Statement:
The Council decided not to pursue an [IFQ] proposal because
recent changes to the [MSA] impose a requirement for an
industry referendum before an [IFQ] can be implemented. The
Council does not believe there is enough time available to
develop a proposal and complete the referendum in time for . . .
[the] implementation date.174
Thus, by eliminating the range of alternatives the Council could consider,
the referendum requirement had a binding effect on the Amendment 16
process.
167. See generally Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1076-77.
168. See supra Part II.A-B.
169. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,262;
Magnuson-Stevens Act, Pub. L. No. 109-479, Sec. 104(5), MSA § 303 note.
170. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(6)(D)(i).
171. Christel, supra note 161.
172. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 20.
173. The points system involved “tradable biological referenced points rather than
pounds of fish.” Id. The Council, based on guidance by NMFS, ultimately concluded
that the points system was legally indistinguishable from IFQs and would therefore
trigger the referendum requirement. Letter from Patricia Kurkul, Reg’l Adm’r, Northeast
Regional Office, NOAA Fisheries, to New England Fisheries Mgmt. Council (June 18,
2008) [hereinafter Kurkul Letter] (on file with author); Christel, supra note 161.
174. AMENDMENT 16 DEIS, supra note 165, at 23.
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Such an effect undermines the purpose of the national catch share
guidelines. Section 303A is intended to provide the Council with
flexibility in its ability to modify existing FMPs through the use of catch
share programs.175 And while section 303A is meant to establish
boundaries for the Council, nothing in the MSRA or the bill’s legislative
history indicates that Congress meant for the section’s requirements to be
outcome-determinative on the Council’s process. Yet, analysis of the
Amendment 16 process reveals that, somewhat paradoxically, the
referendum did become outcome-determinative. By inserting the
referendum requirement into section 303A, Congress was attempting to
protect New England fishermen from being forced into an unwanted
catch share program. However, the combined effect of the MSRA’s
mandated annual catch limits, the deadlines imposed by Amendment 13,
and the referendum requirement was to limit the range of alternatives
that the Council could consider.
As a result, members of Council, and thus fishermen, were faced
with a stark alternative: maintain the status quo or develop a catch share
program that is exempt from the referendum requirement.
III. THE SECTOR PROGRAM: AN INNOVATIVE OR IMPERFECT SOLUTION?
The Council’s response to the bind created by the referendum
requirement and mandatory deadlines was to create two management
regimes for the New England groundfish fishery: a status quo, inputbased fishery, and a voluntary catch share alternative—sector
allocation—not subject to the referendum requirement or the national
guidelines under section 303A. This section analyzes the details of the
two management alternatives and explains why the sector program is an
imperfect solution to a confounding problem.
A. The No-Alternative Alternative—Sector Allocation and the “Common
Pool”
1. Sectors
Simply put, sectors are a form of group fishing quota, as opposed to
individual fishing quota. The sector program allocates a percentage of
the fishery’s TAC to individual sectors.176 Each sector is made up of
175. Kurkul Symposium, supra note 144.
176. As codified in the groundfish FMP, a “sector” is defined as:
a group of persons holding limited access NE multispecies permits who have
voluntarily entered into a contract and agree to certain fishing restrictions for a
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fishermen who have voluntarily entered into a contract with one
another.177 Individual fishermen are allotted a catch history; in turn, the
sector’s TAC is the aggregate of each sector member’s catch history.178
To that end, sectors are self-selecting, self-forming, and, to a certain
extent, self-governing.179 Each sector retains the right to choose its
members.180 Likewise, the decision to join a sector is that of the
individual fishermen; sector membership is not required under
Amendment 16.181 Once a permit holder enters a sector, the permit
holder and the sector must come to a contractual agreement as to the
permit holder’s share of the sector’s TAC.182 This is a distinctive feature
of the sector program—without membership, sectors have no allocation
of the annual catch limit; conversely, without joining a sector, a
fishermen’s catch history is worthless.183 Thus, there is a symbiotic
relationship between the sector and the permit holder. An additional
distinguishing factor between sector program and traditional catch share
programs is the presence of joint and several liability for regulatory
infractions (e.g., if one member exceeds the sector’s TAC, all sector
members must cease fishing).184
2. The “Common Pool”
The second alternative for fishermen is known as the “common
pool.”185 Fishermen in the common pool are allowed to harvest the
remaining portion of the fishery’s annual catch limit that is not allocated
to the sectors.186 Unlike the fishermen fishing under the sector program,
common pool fishermen fish under a days-at-sea restriction; thus, they
specified period of time, and that have been allocated a portion of the TACs of
species managed under the NE Multispecies FMP to achieve objectives consistent
with the applicable goals and objectives of the FMP. 50 C.F.R. § 648.2 (2010).
177. Id.
178. Id. Generally, an individual’s catch history consists of his or her historical
landings from 1996-2006, but this period may vary based on the specific type of permit
held. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262, 18,276
(Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
179. See 50 C.F.R. § 648.2.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 18,267; see also MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 13.
182. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 12.
183. Id.
184. Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1078.
185. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262,
18,267 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
186. Id. at 18,268.
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are subject to the many problems associated with input controls.187 For
this reason, many fishermen sardonically refer to the common pool as the
“cesspool,” and membership in the common pool is significantly lower
than that of the sector program.188
B. The Legal Basis for Sectors
In approving Amendment 16, the Council, relying on legal advice
from NMFS, determined that the sector program did not fall within the
section 303A requirements because the program did not meet the legal
definition of IFQ or “limited access privilege program” as defined under
the MSRA. Understanding the legal rationale for sectors will, in turn,
help demonstrate that sectors are not the innovative solution they are
touted to be, but, rather, a cleverly crafted program designed to evade the
referendum requirement and still comply with legal requirements.
The Council and NMFS’ justification for excluding sectors from
section 303A rests on the fact that there is no direct allocation of quota
under the sector program.189 The MSRA defines an IFQ as “a Federal
permit under a limited access system to harvest a quantity of fish,
expressed by a unit or units representing a percentage of the total
allowable catch of a fishery that may be received or held for exclusive
use by a person.”190 Under the sector program, there is no direct
allocation of quota to the permit holder (the fisherman or vessel owner);
instead, a catch history is issued to the permit holder, which, in turn, may
be pledged towards the sector’s allocation of TAC.191 Because the sector
is a voluntary contractual arrangement between fishermen, “there is no
Federal permit issued to the ‘sector’ per se.”192 Thus, the symbiotic
relationship between the sector and the permit holder becomes a crucial
distinction in this legal justification. Sectors serve as the “vehicle” for
allowing fishermen to receive their allocation of personal catch history;

187. Id.; see also MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 13.
188. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 45. Although the precise number is
difficult to ascertain, due to inactive permits, it is estimated that more than ninety percent
of active groundfish fishermen joined the sector program. Beth Quimby, New Rules,
Same Struggle: Staying Afloat, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, Apr. 3, 2011,
http://www.pressherald.com/news/new-rules-same-struggle-staying-afloat_2011-0403.html.
189. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,292.
190. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(23) (2006).
191. See supra Part III.A.
192. Kurkul Letter, supra note 173.
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but, in separating the quota allocation from the permit, sectors remain
outside of the definition of IFQ and limited access privilege.193
C. Benefits of the Sector Program
As of May 2011, the sector program will have been in operation for
one year. For that reason, it is difficult to know what the long-term
effects of the program will be. To be sure, the program in New England
has already produced several “on the ground” advantages. From a
biological standpoint, the imposition of a TAC on the fishery allows
managers to directly control fish mortality.194 And, although the
determination of TAC can be a heavily politicized process, thus far the
Council has imposed stringent quotas on many of the overfished
stocks.195 Moreover, because sectors are jointly and severally liable for
overfishing their quota, sectors and sector fishermen have a strong
incentive to remain within their quota limits. Indeed, in the first year of
the sector program, no sector exceeded its quota.196
Likewise, from a fisherman’s perspective, the sector program
provides immediate advantages as well. First and foremost, sectors
provide fishermen with the flexibility to “experiment with alternative
management approaches and to adjust management with relative ease.”197
In practice, this means that fishermen are not bound to a strict IFQ-style
quota system. Instead, individual sectors may, and in fact do, assign and
trade quota in a variety of different ways.198 One sector, for example, has
created a quasi-IFQ system, allowing free trade of quota between
members.199 In contrast, another sector, in Maine, does not individually
allocate quota, instead allowing members to competitively fish for that
sector’s TAC.200 Additionally, sectors provide fishermen with many of
the advantages of traditional catch share programs, such as more
flexibility in the time in which fishermen choose to harvest their allotted
catch, greater marketing opportunities, higher market prices, and, in turn,
a better economic return from the fishery.201
193. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,296.
194. See supra Part II.C.
195. Quimby, supra note 188.
196. Id.
197. Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1079.
198. Interview with Jonathan Labaree, Collaborative Fisheries Strategies Program
Manager, Gulf of Me. Research Inst., (Mar. 24, 2011) (notes on file with author).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Holland & Wiersma, supra note 5, at 1080; Quimby, supra note 188.
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D. Criticism of the Sector Program
Although at first glance the sector program seems to be an innovative
solution to a difficult problem—ending overfishing in the groundfish
fishery while providing the flexibility to appease a wide-range of
participants and meet strenuous legal requirements—sectors remain an
imperfect response for two major reasons. First, the sector program has
no significant safeguards to protect against excessive quota allocation or
consolidation. Second, providing fishermen with the option of the
common pool leaves them with a Hobson’s choice, and, thus, no
alternative to the sector program.
1. Protections Against Excessive Consolidation and Quota Allocation
The primary problem with the sector program is that it contains no
cap on quota allocation. As originally proposed, the program limited
quota allocation to twenty percent of the fishery’s TAC;202 however, the
final rule contains no cap, allowing for unrestrained accumulation of
quota.203 This raises several issues. As discussed above, the TAC
imposed under Amendment 16 was set at a low level.204 Indeed, much of
the push for the sector program was based on the rationale that the
fishery could not function at the low levels under the existing regulatory
system. Yet, even under the sector program, the low catch limits are
likely to be too small to support the current number of fishery
participants.205 Thus, it is widely acknowledged that the sector program
will result in accumulation of quota and some degree of consolidation.206
The major concern, however, is that with the TAC set at such low levels,
excessive consolidation will occur, leading to a “lack of diversity in the
groundfish fleet.”207
202. Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262,
18,296 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
203. Id.
204. Northeast Multispecies Fishery; Notice of a Control Date for the Purpose of
Limiting Excessive Accumulation of Control in the Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery;
NE Multispecies Fishery Management Plan (FMP), 76 Fed. Reg. 19,305, 19,306 (Apr. 7,
2011) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. Although a detailed discussion of the importance of diversity in a fishing fleet
is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is important to note that a diverse fishing fleet
provides a number of benefits. These benefits include, but are not limited to: economic
benefits from a wider-range of economic activities spread throughout a variety of fishing
communities; the preservation of cultural heritage and community values; and ecological
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Additionally, the cost-sharing framework of the sector program
augments the likelihood of excessive consolidation. The costs of
maintaining the sector program, like any catch share program, are
extensive.208 These costs primarily include monitoring and enforcement
costs and are surprisingly large, particularly in the case of the sector
program, which encompasses a wide geographic area.209 Recognizing
the costs associated with catch share programs, Congress, in section
303A, capped NMFS’ ability to shift this burden onto fishermen by
including a cost-recovery limit of three percent of the total ex-vessel
value of the fishery.210 The sector program, however, is not subject to a
cost-recovery cap and the costs borne by fishermen are estimated to be as
high as twenty percent of ex-vessel value.211 Indeed, under the sector
program, fishermen are responsible for funding one hundred percent of
the mandatory reporting and monitoring costs.212 And, although NMFS
has agreed to fund some of these costs until 2012, these costs will
significantly impact the economically marginal fishermen in the fleet,
particularly small-boat operators,213 a group that Congress explicitly
aimed to protect through section 303A.214
Perhaps the most troubling issue with the lack of allocation and
consolidation safeguards in the sector program is that there is little legal
recourse for affected groups.215 The omission of an allocation cap
appears to run afoul of current statutory and regulatory provisions.
National Standard Four of the MSRA provides that any allocation of
fishing privileges must be “carried out in such manner that no particular
individual, corporation, or other entity acquires an excessive share of
such privileges.”216 Similarly, the groundfish FMP mandates that the
benefits from diversity of fishing method, location, and target species. Brett Tolley,
Policy Advocate, Northwest Atlantic Marine Alliance, Testimony Before the New
England Fishery Mgmt. Council on Excessive Fleet Consolidation and the Impact to the
Marine Ecosystem 4 (Sept. 30, 2010) (transcript on file with author).
208. Labaree, supra note 198.
209. Id.
210. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1853a(e), 1854(d)(2)(B).
211. MACINKO & WHITMORE, supra note 8, at 31. Ex-vessel value refers to the price
fishermen receive for their fish.
212. See Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. 18,262,
18,297 (Apr. 9, 2010) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 648); see also Holland & Wiersma,
supra note 5, at 1080; Quimby, supra note 188.
213. Kurkul Symposium, supra note 144.
214. 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(c)(5)(B)(i).
215. See City of New Bedford v. Locke, No. 10-10789-RWZ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
70895 (D. Mass. June 30, 2011).
216. Id. § 1851(a)(4).
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Council and NMFS maintain fleet diversity.”217 However, because of the
way that the Council bifurcated the quota and permit ownership,
National Standard Four does not apply.218 Similar to the justification
made to avoid the referendum requirement, NMFS has stated that
because the quota allocation is not made directly to the permit holder, no
allocation of fishing privileges has been made, as required under
National Standard Four.219 Further, NMFS justified the lack of allocation
cap on the basis that consolidation does not amount to “compromising
the diversity of the fleet” per se.220 That said, given that “sectors are
primarily formed to realize efficiencies . . . out of consolidation or
redistribution of sector vessel effort,”221 it is difficult to imagine a
scenario where intense allocation of quota does not compromise the
diversity of the fleet.
2. The Common Pool Alternative
Much of the justification for sectors is based on the voluntary nature
of the program.222 Sector proponents note that rather than forcing an
unwanted catch share program on to the fishery, the Council is providing
fishermen with an alternative; thus, proponents tout this distinctive
feature as an innovative way to reconcile the benefits of catch shares
with divergent individual and community values.223 To be sure, by the
letter of the law, sectors are voluntary.224 Individual fishermen choose
whether or not to join the sector program; if they do not want to
participate in the program, they may fish in the common pool, subject to
the existing days-at-sea regulatory framework.225
In practice, however, the common pool alternative exists as such in
name only. The low catch limits set under Amendment 16 provide a
dramatic reduction in TAC and the deleterious effects of a combined
input/output control management system are well known among New
England fishermen.226 The fact that nearly ninety percent of active
groundfish fishermen joined the sector program is indicative of this
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery, 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,295-96.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18,296.
AMENDMENT 16 DEIS, supra note 167, at 124.
See, e.g., ONE LAST CHANCE, supra note 5, at 17-18.
Id.
Id.
Northeast (NE) Multispecies Fishery; Amendment 16, 75 Fed. Reg. at 18,275.
See supra Part II.A-B.
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sentiment.227 Thus, regardless of the legal niceties of Amendment 16, the
practical effect of the sector program is to implement a mandatory catch
share regime on the fishery.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
In light of this Comment’s criticisms of the sector program, this Part
sets forth recommendations on how to improve both the current sector
program and the national guidelines for catch shares under the MSRA.
A. Fixing the Sector Program
The sector program was a carefully constructed solution to a
complex set of legal requirements and regulatory deadlines. Certainly,
the sector program has elicited some immediate benefits and provides a
unique framework from which to move forward. However, the lack of
anti-consolidation measures leaves the diversity of the groundfish fishery
at risk and increases the likelihood of the fishery realizing exacting social
and economic costs as a result. The lack of protective measures within
the sector program is inapposite with the express intent of Congress,
expressed in section 303A of the MSRA, to establish such measures.
Moreover, protecting the diversity of the fishery is mandated by the
current FMP and is important to the economic, biologic, and cultural
survival of the fishery.228 Fortunately, the solution is not difficult: the
Council should amend the groundfish FMP to include caps on quota
allocation and impose a limit on cost-recovery. Doing so will temper the
pace of consolidation and allow for a more diverse fishery.
B. Improving Section 303A
1. Repealing the Referendum Requirement
Congress enacted section 303A with the specific intent of protecting
the interests of fishermen and fishing communities from the adverse
social and economic effects of catch share programs.229 However, the
New England referendum requirement—a provision enacted to quell the
fears of the most ardent catch share opponents, New England
227. See Quimby, supra note 188.
228. See supra Part III.C.
229. See 16 U.S.C. § 1853a(5)(b) (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 5018, at 31-51 (2006); S. REP.
NO. 109-229, at 26-47 (2006).
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fishermen—produced an outcome contrary to congressional intent. As
demonstrated by the Amendment 16 process, the referendum
requirement steered the Council towards a catch share program that
provided decidedly less protection to fishermen.
For that reason, the outcome of the Amendment 16 process has
important implications for other New England fisheries. While the
groundfish fishery is the first major New England fishery to adopt a
catch share program, it is unlikely to be the last. Thus, Congress should
repeal the referendum requirement under section 303A. Doing so will
afford the Council the flexibility to enact a catch share program that best
suits the fishery at hand while ensuring the protective benefits of section
303A. The Amendment 16 process has demonstrated that the desired
result of the referendum—protection of the interests of stakeholders in
the fishery—will not be the final outcome. Instead, the referendum
requirement undermines the broader purpose of section 303A.
2. Broadening the Scope of Section 303A
At the national level the Amendment 16 process raises an interesting
question: was the bind placed on the Council—a bind caused by a
combination of regulatory imposed deadlines, historic overfishing, and a
New England specific referendum requirement—a unique circumstance?
That is, will the circumstances that befell the New England Council
reappear in the future? The question is a compelling one, and one that is
difficult to predict. On the other hand, it is possible to look at what sort
of precedent the Amendment 16 process will set for future Regional
Fishery Management Councils, and that precedent is a dangerous one.
Congress enacted section 303A to balance the benefits of catch share
programs with the reoccurring negative socioeconomic impacts. The
sector program is unquestionably a catch share. Quota is allocated to
groups of fishermen, who are then able to fish, buy, and sell that quota.
Yet, by the simple fact that the quota and permit are separated—as a
matter of law but not practice—the sector program is not subject to the
protective measures of section 303A. Thus, sectors establish a precedent
of evading hard-fought statutory requirements through the use of clever
legal construction. Therefore, Congress should broaden the definition of
limited access privilege program and IFQ to include quota that is
allocated to groups of permit-holders, such as sectors.
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V. CONCLUSION
Fisheries management is evolving and the use of market-based
management approaches will continue to play a significant role in that
development. As a result, the debate over catch share programs, and
how to mitigate their potential downsides, is likely to continue. The
issues are complex and there appears to be no easy answer. Sectors have
been offered as an innovative solution—an attempt to ameliorate the
socioeconomic ills that often accompany market-based management
programs by shifting much of the decision-making authority from the
government onto the fishermen. A closer inspection of the sector
program, however, reveals that sectors are an inadequate answer to a
complicated question. In crafting the sector program, the Council
devolved too much authority to the sectors, leaving the fishery
vulnerable to excessive allocation of quota and consolidation.
Yet the sector program can still prove instructive. Congress can
view the Amendment 16 process as a signal that their efforts to create a
national set of guidelines for catch share programs is incomplete. By
broadening the scope of section 303A, Congress can ensure that all catch
share programs are subject to the protective safeguards of the MSRA.
Likewise, by removing the referendum requirement from section 303A,
Congress can eliminate the perverse incentive created by the provision,
and force the Council to comply with the national guidelines.

